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Repeated game : ウィキペディア英語版 | Repeated game In game theory, a repeated game (supergame or iterated game) is an extensive form game which consists in some number of repetitions of some base game (called a stage game). The stage game is usually one of the well-studied 2-person games. It captures the idea that a player will have to take into account the impact of his current action on the future actions of other players; this is sometimes called his reputation. The presence of different equilibrium properties is present because the threat of retaliation is real, since one will play the game again with the same person. It can be proved that every strategy that has a payoff greater than the minmax payoff can be a Nash Equilibrium, which is a very large set of strategies. ''Single stage game'' or ''single shot game'' are names for non-repeated games. ==Finitely vs infinitely repeated games== Repeated games may be broadly divided into two classes, depending on whether the horizon is finite or infinite. The results in these two cases are very different. Even finitely repeated games are not necessarily finite horizon, the player may just perceive a probability of another cycle and act accordingly. For example, the fact that everyone has a fixed lifetime doesn't mean that all games should be finite horizon. Also, players might act differently when the horizon is far away as opposed to when it is close by, which can probably be thought of as a time modifier function applied to the payoff. The difference in strategies for finite versus infinite horizon games is a hotly debated topic, and many game theorists have differing views regarding it.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)』 ■ウィキペディアで「Repeated game」の詳細全文を読む
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